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United States v. Leon: The Adoption
of Justice White's Good-Faith
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
I.

INTRODUCTION

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution gives
people the right "to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and
2
seizures" by the government.' In accordance with this "right," there
is a corresponding "remedy" 3 that protects the individual when that
right is violated. Traditionally, when an individual's fourth amendment right was violated, the courts would activate the exclusionary
rule4 to suppress the use of any illegally obtained evidence from the
prosecutor's case.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has been expressing its disenchantment with the exclusionary rule and has been "positioning itself''
1. The fourth amendment provides in its entirety:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. The right to be secure under the fourth amendment means that a person
is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures
wherever he may be. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). See generally
Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
3. The remedy afforded when a citizen's privacy right is violated and his
property seized, is the illegally seized property cannot be used as evidence against
the citizen.
4. The first member of the Supreme Court to use the term "exclusionary rule"
was Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 520 (1943).
However, the hallmark case expanding the application of the exclusionary rule to
the states was Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Mapp the Court stated that
all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the federal Constitution is inadmissible in a criminal trial in a state court. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
For a complete discussion of the history of the exclusionary rule, see general'ly Bernardi, The Exclusionary Rule: Is a Good Faith Standard Needed to Preserve
a Liberal Interpretationof the Fourth Amendment?, 30 DE PAUL L. REV. 51 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Bernardi]; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 665 (1970); Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and
Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure Cases, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1983).
5. The term "positioning" means that the Court has been gradually reformu-
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to strictly modify the standard by which the rule is operated.' This

"positioning" began as a gradual "reformulating"

7

of the rationale

that supported the use of the rule and has culminated in the decision
of United States v. Leon.' Therein, the Court limited the use of the
exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct 9 and also adopted Justice

White's "good-faith exception"'

0

to the rule. With this exception,

illegally seized evidence may now be used in the prosecutor's case-inchief if it was obtained in good-faith reliance on a search warrant
issued by a "detached and neutral" magistrate."
This casenote will examine the exclusionary rule and its goodfaith exception with a focus on three areas. First, the development
of the exclusionary rule will be explained with emphasis given to its
three major jurisprudential rationales. Next, a discussion of the
Leon case will demonstrate how the adoption of the good-faith exception was symptomatic of the Court's progression toward a less

powerful view of the exclusionary rule. Finally, after a critique of
the Court's conclusions in Leon, the impact of Leon will be discussed
in view of its possible ramifications regarding fourth amendment
jurisprudence.
II.

THE HISTORY AND

DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY

RULE

Before 1886, the courts ignored the manner in which evidence
lating the justificatory rationale given in support of the rule's position in fourth
amendment jurisprudence. Bernardi, supra note 4, at 51. See infra notes 19-65 and
accompanying text.
6. The Burger Court has implied that the exclusionary rule's use is too broad;
therefore, the Court has recently moved toward limiting the rule's use from the protection of individual rights to the deterrence of official misconduct. See Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 38 (1974).
7. The term "reformulating" refers to the Court's analytical emphasis that
has gradually changed from one of rights to one of remedies. Bernardi, supra note
4, at 51.
8. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
9.Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3408. See infra text accompanying notes 48-59.
10. The "good-faith exception" doctrine states that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule should not be applied to bar the use of evidence obtained by officers
acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral
magistrate but ultimately found to be invalid. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539
(1976) (Stone, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 60-65.
11. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3416. The Leon Court does not expressly define
"detached and neutral." However, for purposes of the fourth amendment, "detached
and neutral" magistrates are magistrates who are removed in their work from the
prosecutor and/or the police. See e.g. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345
(1972).
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was obtained in making determinations as to its admissibility in court.' 2
The admissibility of the evidence was not affected by the illegal means

through which the party obtained the evidence.' 3 Not until Boyd v.
United States'4 in 1886 did the Supreme Court lay the foundation for
the modern fourth amendment exclusionary rule.' 5
Over the years, three rationales have survived in varying degrees
of force to support the exclusionary rule. First, the rule is considered
to be necessary to protect an individual's right of privacy against illegal
search and seizure.' 6 Second, the rule is necessary to maintain judicial
integrity.' Third, the rule is needed to deter official misconduct.'"
A.

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS RATIONALE

The need to exclude self-incriminating evidence in order to protect
an individual's right to privacy was a key concern in the evolution
of the exclusionary rule. In Boyd, the Court evaluated the need to
protect an individual's personal right to privacy together with the right

against self-incrimination.' 9 Therein, the trial court compelled the
12. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (McNaughton ed. 1961). How the
evidence was found was not considered collateral to the criminal proceeding, thus
the courts ignored the manner in which it was obtained.
13. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841) (admitting
that lottery tickets were illegally seized, yet this was not considered a legal objection
to the admission of them in evidence).
14. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
15. Id. at 638.
16. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94, 398 (1914) (In a federal
prosecution the fourth amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an
illegal search and seizure on grounds that such illegal search and seizure is a violation
of individual constitutional rights). See infra notes 19-35 and accompanying text.
17. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960) (The exclusionary rule
was held to compel respect for the constitutional guarantee of the fourth amendment
by suppressing illegally seized evidence. The suppression of illegally seized evidence
serves to uphold the integrity of the court). See also Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928). See infra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
18. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) ("The primary justification for
the exclusionary rule is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have established that the rule is not a personal
constitutional right."). Id. See also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). See infra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
19. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. The Court relied on both the fourth and fifth amendments in its decision, considering the two amendments as running almost into each
other. The Supreme Court said that the doctrines of those amendments:
... apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees
of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the
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defendant to produce a self-incriminating invoice pursuant to a statute,
under which failure to produce such document was taken as a confession to the accusation charged.2" The case was decided against Boyd
on the basis of his noncompliance with the statute. 2 ' The Supreme
Court found the statute to be unconstitutional and reversed the lower
court's decision. The Court indicated that to compel the defendant
to produce his private documents was an unreasonable search and
seizure under the fourth amendment.22 It was from the Boyd decision that the rationale of excluding evidence unlawfully obtained
became tied to an individual's constitutional guarantees.
Stronger arguments supporting the individual rights theory can
be found in two prominent cases on this subject, Weeks v. United
States2 3 and Mapp v. Ohio.24 In Weeks, the Court clarified the Boyd
ruling when it held that seizure of evidence, unconstitutional under
the fourth amendment, would not be admissible in a trial against
criminal defendants. 25 Justice Day therein explained that evidence illegally seized must be excluded in order to remedy the individual's
privacy invasion.26
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes
the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right
of personal security, personal liberty and private property....
Id. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
20. The statute in Boyd was "an act to amend the customs-revenue laws and
to repeal moieties," ch. 391, § 12, 18 Stat. 186 (1874). This statute was found to
be unconstitutional as it violated both the fourth and fifth amendments to the Constitution. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 638.
21. In Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), the Supreme Court largely
repudiated its conclusion in the Boyd opinion which would apply the fourth amendment to an order to produce a document, a matter that was properly part of the
fifth amendment's exclusive domain. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264
(McNaughton ed. 1961).
In 1914, however, the Supreme Court revived the dictim of the Boyd case in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
22. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
23. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Weeks no search warrant was obtained to secure
records which would support the charge of using the mail to transport illegal
paraphernalia.
24. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Mapp the defendant was convicted of possession
of obscene literature. No search warrant was issued, but the Ohio Supreme Court
found that under Ohio law evidence obtained by an unlawful search and seizure
is admissible in a criminal prosecution.
25. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.

26. In Weeks the Court stated:
If the letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used
in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such seizures
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Mapp extended the Weeks federal exclusionary rule to state court
proceedings.2 7 Justice Clark, writing for the majority, overruled the
28
earlier decision in Wolf v. Colorado, where the exclusionary rule
was limited to federal court proceedings, and held as a matter
of due process that evidence obtained by a search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment is inadmissible in a state court as it
is in a federal court. 29 It was also in this case that the exclusionary
rule was given a constitutional dimension: according to Justice Clark,
"[o]ur decision [which was ultimately to exclude the evidence of the
unlawful search and seizure] . . . gives to the individual no more than
that which the Constitution guarantees him . ... 0
The Mapp Court viewed the exclusion doctrine as "an essential
part of the right to privacy." 3 As stated in Weeks, the improperly
seized objects must be returned to the victim, or he continues to suffer
32
an ongoing abridgement of his constitutional rights.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court reconceptualized the invasion
of an individual's right to privacy as a single invasion rather than
a continuing violation. This limiting provision was established in United
3 3 Therein the Supreme Court reversed the lower
States v. Calandra.
court's holding, that a witness may refuse to answer questions based
on evidence of an unlawful search and seizure, and decided that the
witness cannot refuse to answer such questions."' Calandra's argument,
that every question based on evidence obtained illegally constitutes
a new and independent violation of the witness' constitutional rights,
was renounced by the Court. According to Justice Powell, the wrong
was completed when the unlawful intrusion occurred. Thus, questions
by the grand jury could not in any sense be regarded as independent
is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as
well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are
not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years
of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
27. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656.
28. 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (holding that the exclusionary rule is not binding on
the states).
29. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
30. Id. at 660. The Court reasoned that "[tlo hold otherwise is to grant the
right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment." Id. at 656.
31. Id. at 656.
32. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.

33. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
34. Id.at 339, 342.
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violations. Accordingly, the issue concerning the use of illegally obtained evidence becomes one of remedies and not one of rights." Thus,
the individual rights rationale was no longer a justification for imposing the exclusionary rule.
B.

JUDICIAL INTEGRITY RATIONALE

The individual rights theory focuses on the victims of illegal search
and seizure, whereas the judicial integrity theory focuses on the detriment to the judiciary of allowing illegally seized evidence to be admitted
into evidence against a defendant in violation of his constitutional
rights. 6 According to this theory, the exclusionary rule allows the
judge to act as a check and balance upon illegally seized evidence. 7
The Court must not permit the fruits of an unconstitutional search
and seizure to become evidence, or the Court will have abandoned
its duty as chief protector and defender of the Constitution. 8
Since the Weeks decision in 1914, other Supreme Court justices
have underscored the rationale of judicial integrity as a justification
for the exclusionary rule.39 The court in Elkins v. United States" based
its decision to overrule the "silver platter doctrine""' on the imperative
35. Id. at 353-54. A federal grand jury, investigating illegal loan-sharking activities, questioned a witness about the evidence that was seized by the government
during a search of the witness' place of business. The witness refused to testify on
fifth amendment grounds and sought to have the seized evidence suppressed and
returned. The district court and court of appeals held that the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule was properly invoked by the witness. However, the Supreme Court
reversed the lower courts and stated that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule
was not a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. See id. at 348.
For a discussion of Calandra in view of its impact on the deterrence rationale,
see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
36. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 353-54.

37. This idea was originally stated in Justice Day's opinion in Weeks:

the duty of giving . . .[fourth amendment protection] force and effect is

obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws
of the country to obtain conviction by lawful means of unlawful seizures
...should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged
at all times with the support of the Constitution.
232 U.S. at 392; see also Bernardi, supra note 4, at 56.
38. See, e.g., Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222-23.
39. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960).
40. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
41. Id. at 208. Elkins overruled the "silver platter doctrine," where state officials typically seized evidence and handed it to federal prosecutors who did not

[1985:3351

UNITED STATES V. LEON

of judicial integrity. Quoting Justices Holmes and Brandeis in Olmstead
v. United States,42 the Court stated that "[i]f the Government becomes

'4 3
a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law." Thus, the Court decided
not to participate in any disobedience of the Constitution and to suppress any evidence illegally seized by state officials to be used in federal
court.
Those that advocate the judicial integrity rationale believe that
by the Court's refusing to comply with official misconduct, the court
is ultimately protecting the individual from abusive power by the
government." However, later exclusionary rule cases such as Linkletter
v. Walker' and United States v. Calandra4 noted Elkins for emphasizing the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule rather than
47
the need to activate the rule to preserve judicial integrity. The courts
in those two cases view the rule as a judicially created remedy to
be used by the court to safeguard fourth amendment rights.

C.

DETERRENCE RATIONALE

Although the three rationales for the exclusionary rule have

somewhat co-existed since Mapp, the focus has shifted from the individual rights theory and the need to preserve its judicial integrity to
the need to prevent fourth amendment violations by deterring official
misconduct. The deterrence rationale was initiated by Justice Clark
participate in the search and seizure. Id. at 206-07.
42. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). In Olmstead, Justice Brandeis stated in his dissenting
opinion: "To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies
the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure
the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that
pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face." Id. at 485 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). Justice Holmes, dissenting in the same case, was equally as articulate:
"We have to choose, and for my part I think it is a less evil that some criminals
should escape than the Government should play an ignoble part." Id. at 470 (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
43. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223.
44. Bernardi, supra note 4, at 57.
45. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). In Linkletter, it was held that the Mapp rule did not
operate retrospectively upon cases finally decided prior to the Mapp decision. To
make the rule of Mapp retroactive would have taxed "the administration of justice
to the utmost." Hearings would have had to have been held on the excludability of
evidence long since destroyed, misplaced, or deteriorated. "If it was excluded, the
witness available at the time of the original trial would not be available, or if
located, their memory will be dimmed." Id. at 637. See also infra notes 50-54 and
accompanying text.
46. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
47. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 633, Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347-48.
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in his plurality opinion in Mapp,4" but the case that is considered
to have elevated the deterrence rationale above all others is Linkletter
v. Walker.49
In Linkletter, the Court declined to apply Mapp to state convictions which had become final prior to the overruling of Wolf."0 The
Court in Linkletter decided that Mapp's prime purpose was the enforcement of the fourth amendment through the exclusionary rule, which
was the only effective deterrence against lawless police conduct. 5' The
Linkletter Court concluded that this purpose would not be advanced
by making the rule applicable retroactively: "To make the rule of Mapp
retrospective would tax the administration of justice to the utmost." 2
The misconduct of the police prior to Mapp had already occurred
and could not be corrected by releasing the prisoners involved, neither
could the ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and effects be
restored. 53 Chief Justice Burger made it clear in his dissenting opinion
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics"
that he would alter the exclusionary rule, either by eliminating it or
by modifying it, because it was not being used effectively to protect
the rights of innocent victims."
During the mid-seventies, the courts, in general, began limiting
the use of the exclusionary rule with an emphasis on the deterrence
rationale as the justification for those limitations.56 Justice Powell,
writing for the majority in Calandra, declared that the exclusionary
rule was a "judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than
a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."", Two years
48. 367 U.S. at 656; see also Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217.
49. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). See also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
50. Id. at 619. Linkletter overruled Wolf to the extent that it failed to apply
the exclusionary rule to the states. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
51. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636.
52. Id. at 637.
53. Id.
54. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
55. Id. at 418 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice was against the
implementation of a tort remedy in Bivens because of separation of powers considerations. He indicated that he would "support modifications of the exclusionary
rule along either one or both of the following lines: eliminating the rule completely
as soon as a reasonable alternative was developed by the legislature, and restricting
the rule's application to those circumstances involving intentional or flagrant police
misconduct." Id. at 415-16.
56. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1974); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1976).
57. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
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later, the Court in Stone v. Powell 8 stated that the exclusionary rule's
main purpose is to deter police conduct that is in violation of the
5 9
fourth amendment.
D.

"GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION"

In his dissenting opinion in Stone, Justice White first advocated
his "good-faith exception" theory.6" He stated that the exclusionary
rule shortchanges the public interest and "should be substantially
modified so as to prevent its application in those many circumstances
where the evidence at issue was seized by an officer acting in the
good-faith belief that his conduct comported with existing law and
having reasonable grounds for this belief." 6 '
In 1983, Justice White's view on this subject was reemphasized
in his concurring opinion in Illinois v. Gates.62 Therein, he also advocated a balancing approach which would modify the exclusionary
rule to allow the prosecution to introduce evidence in reasonable
good-faith.63
When the petition for certiorari in Gates was granted, the Court
also asked the parties to address the question of modifying the exclusionary rule. Subsequently, however, the Court acknowledged that they
had no jurisdiction to hear such discussion because the question had
been neither raised nor decided in the state courts below. 6 Not until
United States v. Leon 65 did the Court address the question of modifying the exclusionary rule with a good-faith exception.

III.

UNITED STATES V. LEON

Burbank, California police learned from "a confidential infor58. 428 U.S. 338 (1974).

59. Id. at 486. The Court also reiterated that decisions after Mapp have established that the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right. This Court
quoted from Linkletter and Calandra when it stated that the exclusionary rule is
not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the illegal search,
and the reparation for the violation would come too late. Id.
60. Id. at 536-42 (White, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 538. Justice White makes it quite clear that the evidence the defendant is seeking to have excluded is "contraband and stolen property.., the instrumentality of the crime." Id. at 542. Thus, according to Justice White, "if the defendant
in criminal cases may not recover for a mistaken but good-faith invasion of his privacy,
it makes even less sense to exclude the evidence solely on his behalf." Id. at 541-42.
62. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
63. Id. at 2337-38 (White, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 2321.
65. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
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mant of unproven reliability" 6 6 that a sale of cocaine and methaqualone was taking place in a local residence.6 1 When the police arrived
at the residence they noticed cars belonging to respondents Sanchez,
Stewart and Del Castillo parked outside. 6" They became suspicious
of possible narcotics trafficking and launched a full-scale
investigation. 69 The police observed a person leaving the Price Drive
residence with a paper sack and drive off in the Del Castillo car."
A police department computer trace on the Del Castillo car revealed
that respondent Del Castillo had a prior arrest record for possession
of marihuana." This, in turn, prompted the officers to check Del
Castillo's probation record, whereupon they discovered the telephone
number of Albert Leon listed as the number for Del Castillo's
employer.72 The police knew that Leon had a prior drug arrest record. 3
They also had information suggesting that Leon frequently imported
drugs into the United States." Thereafter, police noticed several other
people exit the Price Drive residence with small packages." "A variety
of other material activity'" 6 involving respondents' automobiles was
observed at the Price Drive residence, Leon's residence on South Sunset
Canyon in Burbank and a condominium at 7902 Via Magdelena in
Burbank." Based on the observations made during the investigation
of respondents' residences, police officer Cyril Rombach was issued

66. Id. at 3409. For a discussion of the standard by which a warrant application
supported by an informant's tip should be analyzed, see generally Cover, The Supreme
Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. Rav. 177 (1983); Moylan, Jr., Illinois v. Gates: What
It Did and What It Did Not Do, 20 CRIM L. BULL. 93 (1984); Note, Adoption of
a Flexible Standard for Analyzing Informants' Tips in Illinois v. Gates, 4 N. ILL.
U.L. REv. 179 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Analyzing Informants' Tips]; Note, Probable
Cause: The Abandonment of the Aguilar/Spinelli Standard and Further Evisceration of the Fourth Amendment. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). 83 S.
ILL. U.L.J. 261 (1983).

67. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3409.
68. Id. at 3410. Sanchez had previously been arrested for possession of
marihuana, and Stewart had no criminal record. DelCastillo had been previously
arrested for possession of 50 pounds of marihuana. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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a "facially valid search warrant." 7 8 During the search "large quantities of drugs" 79 were found in the homes at Via Magdelena and

South Sunset Canyon Drive.8" The search of the Price Drive residence
yielded a smaller amount.8 ' "Other evidence" 2 was seized by the police
from the homes and two of the automobiles.8 3
A grand jury indicted the respondents chiefly for "conspiracy
to possess and distribute cocaine." 8 ' Respondents moved to suppress

the evidence seized. The district court "granted the motions to suppress in part"'" finding that there was no probable cause in support

of the warrant.86 Despite the government's motion that the court reconsider the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals affirmed the district court.87 Specifically, the court

of appeals drew three conclusions: 1) the affidavit did not support
probable cause; 2) the information in the affidavit was too old
with regard to informant's knowledge of illegal acts; 3) the affidavit
did not "establish the informant's credibility." 8 8 Therefore, there
was not enough evidence to establish a probability of criminal activity

78. Id. The search warrant that the state superior court judge issued later proved
to be deficient. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
79. One pound of cocaine was found at the South Sunset Canyon address,
more than four pounds of cocaine and 1,165 quaalude tablets were found at the
Via Magdelena address, and an ounce of cocaine was found at the Price Drive
residence. Brief for Respondent at 48-64, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405
(1984).
80. Id.at 3410.
81. Id.
82. The "other evidence" consisted of paraphernalia for testing, cutting, and
packaging cocaine. Scales, a police radio, documents, Leon's receipt for a Rossberg
shotgun, and large amounts of currency were also found. Record for Respondent
at 48-64, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
83. Id. at 3410.
84. Id. In ruling on the motion to suppress, the district court stated that the
reliability and credibility of the informant was not established.
The district court ruled that only respondent Leon had standing to suppress
items seized from the Sunset Canyon house and that Leon had no standing to suppress items seized from any of the other houses and automobiles searched. Brief
for Respondent at 4, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
85. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3411.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. The information was "stale" because the officers did not receive the
informant's tip until five months after the act. Oral Argument for Respondent at
37, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
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under the Aguilar/Spinelli two-prong test. 9 In the petition for certiorari, the government asked for review of the good-faith exception,
with no mention of the probable cause standards." In a six to
three decision, the Supreme Court concluded that the exclusionary
rule should not apply to evidence seized by police who have acted
in good faith reliance on a warrant, despite the fact that error
was made in the issuance of the warrant. 9 1 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals. 92
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE LEON COURT'S DECISION

Justice White, writing for the majority, began the analysis of
Leon by examining the exclusionary rule. The Court stated that based
on past decisions, there is, at best, an implication "that the exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment." 9 3
However, the Leon court considers the exclusionary rule "a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the person aggrieved." '94 Thus, Justice White extricates
the defendant's fourth amendment rights from the exclusionary rule. 95
In deciding whether to exclude evidence, the Court stated that
it must weigh the pros and cons of using evidence seized pursuant96
to a search warrant that is later found to be technically defective.
The exclusionary rule has resulted in significant social costs97 including

89. Id. The Aguilar/Spinelli "two-pronged" test consists of a basis of knowledge
prong and a veracity prong. The latter further consists of a credibility spur and a
reliability spur. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969). Cf. Gates, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983); Note, Analyzing Informant's
Tips, supra note 66, at 200-01.
90. Leon, 104 S.Ct. at 3412.
91. Id. at 3411-12.

92. Id. at 3412.

93. Id. (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651, 655-57 (1961), and Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462-63 (1928)). Justice Brennan (with whom Justice

Marshall joins in this dissenting opinion) disagreed with the majority's argument,
stating "the exclusionary rule is firmly rooted in the fourth amendment." Leon,
104 S.Ct. at 3433 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. Leon, 104 S.Ct. at 3412 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348).
95. Leon, 104 S.Ct. at 3412-13.

96. Id.

97. Id. at 3413. These "social

costs" were first explicated by Chief Justice

Burger in his dissenting opinion in Bivens. Therein he stated, "[slome clear demonstration of the benefits and effectiveness of the exclusionary rule is required to justify
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the release of guilty defendants or the imposition of reduced sentences
through the plea bargaining process;98 the impact of these costs is
a matter of serious concern to the Court.99 As Justice White stated,
"when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith
or their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit

conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the
criminal justice system." ' Thus, the majority maintains that the exclusionary rule should be used as a remedy to avoid disrespect for

the administration of justice in terms of the deterrence of judicial

misconduct.' 0

Next, the Court examined the cases which support the weighing of

it in view of the high price it extracts from society-the release of countless guilty
criminals." Bivens, 403 U.S. at 416 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The "price" may
not be as "high" as the Chief Justice assumed. In an empirical study of cases handled
in 38 United States Attorneys' offices from July 1 - August 31, 1978, it was discovered
that of 2,804 charged defendants only 3076 involved a search or seizure and only
11% filed a motion to suppress based on the fourth amendment. These motions
were denied in the "overwhelming majority" of cases, so that in only 1.307o of the
2,804 defendant cases was evidence excluded as a result of a fourth amendment suppression motion. In addition, over half of the defendants whose motions were granted

in total or in part were nevertheless convicted. See

IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY

RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS: REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL

(April 19, 1979).
Many commentators are in considerable disagreement as to whether the available
empirical evidence proves or disproves that the rule actually deters official misconduct. For an interesting exchange of ideas on the subject, see generally Canon, The
Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven That it Doesn't Deter Police?, 62 JUDICATURE
398 (1979); Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in HistoricalPerspective, 62 JUDICATURE
337 (1979); Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66 (1978); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 214 (1978); Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven That it is a Deterrent to

Police?, 62

JUDICATURE

404 (1979).

98. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3413.
99. Id. See generally, Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest
on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 565, 598-99 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Kamisar, "Principled Basis'"; Mertens
& Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating
the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 379-80 (1981).
100. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3413; see also Stone, 428 U.S. at 490.
101. Leon, 104 S.Ct. at 3412; see also Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 (The two dissenting
opinions both articulate the continued viability of the "judicial integrity" rationale
for the exclusionary rule); Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3431 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id.
at 3447 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
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the parties' interests: Stone v. Powell, 102United States v. Calandra,'I3

and United States v. Janis."' These cases support the use of the

exclusionary rule if its use will serve a significant deterrence of police

misconduct.' 05
The Court then discussed the parameters of "standing to invoke

the rule,"' 6 and decided that the only cases where the defendants
could move for suppression of evidence were those where the prosecution planned "to use the fruits of an illegal search or seizure against
the victim of police misconduct."' 0 7 However, the Court added a further clarification by stating that despite the defendant's position to
suppress illegally seized evidence, he cannot control this evidence in
all aspects of the case. For example, the prosecution can still use the
evidence to impeach the defendant's testimony. '
These concerns carry over to the issuance of search warrants.
As the Court pointed out, there is often a fine line between what
constitutes a valid, as opposed to an invalid, search warrant. Therefore,
in marginal cases, decisions of the magistrate have historically been
given "great deference.""9 However, deference is not an irrebutable
presumption in favor of a magistrate's determination. Three conditions to this deference exist. First, an investigation can still be made
into the truth of the affidavit despite respect paid to the magistrate's
decision." 0 Second, although deference is given to him, the magistrate
102. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
103. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See supra text accompanying notes 33-35 and 56-57.
104. 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (illegally seized evidence by state officials was allowed
to be used in federal civil proceedings).
105. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3414. The Court will also assess the flagrancy of an
official's misconduct in its decision whether or not to exclude the evidence.
106. Id.
107. Id.(citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)); Brown v. United States,
411 U.S. 223 (1973); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)).
108. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3414 (citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)).
See also United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
109. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3417 (citing Spinelli v. United States, 383 U.S. at 419).
See also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969); Gates, 103 S. Ct. at
2332. For search warrants to be valid, they must meet the following requirements
outlined in KAMISAR & L. HALL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 293-303 (2d ed.
1966). The warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, see e.g.,
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The place to be searched must
be described with particularity, see, e.g., Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925).
The things to be seized must be described with particularity, see e.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931). The search warrant must be executed within a fixed period of time, see, e.g., United States v. Nepstead, 424 F.2d
269 (9th Cir. 1970).
110. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3417.
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must remain "neutral and detached" and "not serve merely as a rubber
stamp for police."''" Third, deference will not be given to a warrant
if the information in the affidavit does not support a finding of probable cause." 2 Although Justice White extended these factors to judges
and magistrates, he added that operation of the rule would not affect them."I3
The Court considered the significance of any suppression of evidence in view of deterring improper conduct on the part of police
officials, which would promote good behavior on the part of the police
to make sure their information is adequate and corrrect."' However,
the court maintained that the determination of the exclusion of evidence
should be made as cases arise and only when fourth amendment objectives will be furthered.'' 5
After a discussion of the effects of deterrence on police officers,
the Court concluded that suppression of evidence does not deter police
investigations when the officer performs his job in "objective good
faith" reliance on a warrant." 6 Once a search warrant (valid or not)
is issued, there is no more deterrence of the police officer. The reason
in support of this conclusion is that the police officer has gathered
the information and it is presented to a neutral and detached
magistrate for objective determination. Upon that information, the
magistrate takes the decision into his own hands by making a probable
cause determination. If the search warrant is issued, the police officer is then expected, without questioning the quantum of probable
cause, to act upon that warrant. The matter is beyond the police officer's control once he offers the information.
In the final balancing of the benefits and burdens of the suppression of evidence, the Court summarized that any benefit derived
from the suppression of evidence based on a search warrant later found
invalid does not "justify the substantial costs of exclusion. '
However, in cases where an officer has obtained and abided by
a warrant, exclusion will not be an issue. Exclusion of evidence will

11l.Id.(quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964)).
112. Id.See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
113. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3418.
114. Id.at 3419. The court discussed the idea that officers could study the warrant so carefully that they would be able to foresee possible errors. Id.
115. Id. Exclusion should only be used to "further the purposes of the exclusionary rule." Id.
116. Id. at 3420; see also note 21, at 3420.
117. Id. at 3421.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

be a remedy if there is any misinformation supporting the affidavit, ' I8
if the judge does not remain impartial, ' 9 if the warrant was not
reliable,' 20 if the affidavit supporting the warrant was "so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable," 2 ' or if the warrant was so obviously incorrect' 2 2
that the police officer should have "reasonably" known it was defective or lacking probable cause.' 23 In Leon, the officer's warrant was
based on information from a lengthy investigation which, despite more
than the bare minimum, was not overly abundant with information to make the probable cause determination clear. Given that, the
Supreme Court said it was reasonable for the police officer to rely
on the issuance of the search warrant. Therefore, the Court reasoned
that exclusion of the seized evidence was too severe a penalty.
V.

CRITIQUE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S CONCLUSIONS IN VIEW

OF FOURTH AMENDMENT AND EXCLUSIONARY RULE FUNDAMENTALS

When objectively viewing the majority opinion by Justice White,
without understanding the historical progression of the fourth amendment and exclusionary rule, one gets the impression that the essential
guarantees of the fourth amendment have been forsaken for the need
to secure convictions of criminals. With a closer study of the majority's systematic approach to the "good-faith exception," however, this
decision becomes, at best, discernable.' 24
The Supreme Court's conclusion that the exclusionary rule is not
an essential consequence of the fourth amendment, but instead "a
judicially created remedy designed to protect fourth amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect . .. 25 is the thesis statement
for an opinion that has been written gradually, fragments at a time,
over the last 100 years. 26 By the time the Court decided the Leon case,

118. Id. See also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

119. Id. 104 S. Ct. at 3422. See LoJi Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319

(1979).

120. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422.

121. Id. (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (Powell, J., concurring in part)).

122. Id.

123. Id.

124. See generally Brief for Respondent, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405

(1984). See infra text accompanying notes 19-65 and 93-95.
125. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348).
126. The development of the exclusionary rule literally began with Boyd, 116
U.S. 616 (1886), and ended with the Leon decision in 1984. Further development
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there was no longer any mention of the protection of individual rights
by excluding evidence illegally seized. The Leon Court effectuated this
by divorcing the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule.' 27 Now,

the exclusionary rule is to be viewed as only a judicially created

remedy that a court, and only a court, can bestow when there is

an obvious need to deter judicial officers' misconduct.' 28
The Court's focus in Leon is chiefly on those cases that support

the deterrence rationale, with little or no mention of cases, such as
Mapp and Weeks, that outline the traditional views of the fourth
amendment and exclusionary rule.' 29 Therefore, the need to distinguish

such cases that give support to the traditional rationales of individual

rights and judicial integrity is never brought to the foreground. According to Justice White, there is no longer any issue as to which

rationale justifies the exclusionary rule. For him, the only valid rationale is the deterrence rationale with its "good-faith exception."' 3

Justice White's balancing approach, weighing the costs and
benefits of preventing the use of illegally obtained evidence from the
prosecutor's case-in-chief, assumes the best from everyone: the
"reasonable" police officer' 3 ' and the "detached and neutral"
magistrates and judges.' 32 However, there is no deference given to
the accused's rights as guaranteed to him under the fourth
amendment.' 33 Thus, in the government's critical and pressing conof the exclusionary rule and fourth amendment jurisprudence is now considered to
be frozen for the future. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
128. Id. at 3421-22. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
129. The Court focuses on those cases that deal with the deterrence rationale:
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), and Stone, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); see supra notes
56-59 and accompanying text. The Court in its opinion barely mentions Weeks, 232
U.S. 383 (1914), and Mapp, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
130. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3419 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Is Leon a de facto
overruling of Mapp? Justice White does not specifically state whether Leon overrules Mapp.

131. According to the "good-faith exception," if a police officer obtains evidence
in reasonable reliance on a search warrant, then that evidence will be deemed admissible if the warrant is later found to be invalid. Id. at 3421.
132. According to the "good-faith exception," if the magistrate remained
"detached and neutral" in issuing a search warrant that is later found to be invalid,
that evidence obtained pursuant to the deficient warrant will still be admissible in
the prosecutor's case-in-chief. Id. at 3416. See also Oral Argument for Respondent
at 22, United States v. Leon, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984).
133. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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cern for expediting the criminal prosecution procedures, there has been
a forsaking of the "commitment to protecting individual liberty and
privacy." 34
The integrity of the judicial system has also been impinged with
the major emphasis on the deterrence rationale. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan expressed concern with the majority's exclusive
focus on the deterrence rationale. He stated that the Court cannot
forsake its "judicial integrity" in seeing that "law enforcement efforts be permanently and unambiguously restricted in order to preserve
personal freedoms."'
Justice White's "good-faith exception" '36 to the exclusionary rule
resembles the type of modification that Justice Burger was calling
for in Bivens. '17 In theory it tightens the reins of the officials in their
quest for the prosecution of criminals by focusing on deterring their
misconduct.' 38 However, in practice those officials who use the
''reasonable mistake' exception to the exclusionary rule will tend to
put a premium on police ignorance of the law."' 3 9 This new "goodfaith exception" makes it more difficult to preserve fourth amendment rights in the future, as an individual can now be convicted by
evidence seized in violation of his fourth amendment rights.' 40
VI.
A.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE "GOOD-FAITH

EXCEPTION"

EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLICATION IN THE FACE OF THE
"GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION"

By adopting the "good-faith exception" in Leon the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule will no longer be applied to bar the use
134. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3431 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra notes 19-35
and accompanying text.
135. Id.

See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.

136. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
137. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 418 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Burger,

Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1964).

138. Although Justice White states that the rule deters "some police misconduct and provides incentives for the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct itself in accord with the Fourth Amendment," he firmly states that "it cannot
be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity." Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3419 (emphasis added). Grounding the exception
in objective reasonableness is Justice White's way of retaining "the value of the
exclusionary rules as an incentive for the law enforcement profession ...

themselves in accord with the fourth amendment."

Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2344, n.15).
139. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3444 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

140. Id. at 3446 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

to conduct

Id. note 20, at 3420 (quoting
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of "evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant." 4 1 Exclusion of evidence after
Leon will now be limited to four specific situations, supported by
42
a sole rationale-deterrence of unlawful police conduct.' These four
situations are: 1) when "the magistrate or judge issuing the warrant
was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was
false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard
of the truth";'4 3 2) when the magistrate "wholly abandoned his judicial
role ... in [which] . . .circumstances, no reasonably well-trained officer should rely on the warrant";' 4 4 3) when the affidavit was "so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in
45
4) when a warrant is facially
its existence entirely unreasonable";'
4 6
exclusionary rule has become
the
deficient.' As a deterrent device,
a judicially created remedy which the Court may now impose to
deter law enforcement officials from violating fourth amendment
rights.141
B.

PROBLEMS WITH THE "GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION"

Regardless of what specific type of punishments are used to deter
police misconduct, something must still be done to ensure compliance
with the victim's fourth amendment rights. Under the "good-faith
exception" subjective ill will is going to be difficult to prove. ' The
Court may have left the doors wide open for police officials to do
as they please under a veil of "good-faith." A host of other problems can also be anticipated with the adoption of the "good-faith
141. Id. at 3421. This is now the current status of the law regarding the exclusionary rule. Justice Blackmun stated in his concurring opinion that this decision
is a "provisional one." He added, "[ijf it should emerge from experience that, contrary to our expectations, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule results
in a material change in police compliance with the Fourth Amendment, we shall
have to reconsider what we have undertaken here." Id. at 3424 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
142. Id.at 3419-20.
143. Id. at 3421.
144. Id. at 3422. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979) (the
magistrate abandoned his judicial role when issuing the search warrant).
145. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422.
146. Id. An example of a facially deficient warrant is one "failing to particularize
the place to be searched or the things to be seized." As a result, an officer "could
not reasonably presume it to be valid." Id.
147. Id.at 3412.
148. According to the respondent's brief, "if good faith is to be a defense to
illegal police conduct, then a full and complete hearing must be held with crossexamination allowed as to why the officer concluded the information was reliable."
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exception," for example magistrate shopping or patronizing by the
police of "rubber stamp" justices,' 49 the promotion of police ignorance
of the law,' 50 and the freezing of the progress of fourth amendment

jurisprudence.'5
C.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE "GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION"

The adoption of the "good-faith exception" in Leon addresses
Chief Justice Burger's concerns as articulated in his famous Bivens
dissent.' 52 Therein, the Chief Justice suggested that the exclusionary
rule has provided neither a deterrent to police officers nor a remedy
to those whose rights have been violated, and therefore alternatives

to the rule should be considered. ' The "good-faith exception" appears to fall within the range of acceptable alternatives to the exclusionary rule, as evidenced by Chief Justice Burger's vote with the
majority in Leon. However, in his dissenting opinion in Bivens, the
Chief Justice stated that "Congress should develop an administrative
or quasi-judicial remedy against the government itself to afford compensation and restitution for persons whose Fourth Amendment rights
have been violated."' 54 Chief Justice Burger set forth guidelines for
a suggested statute.'" This may have been a feasible alternative, but
Congress did not enact any such statute into law.
Brief for Respondent at 8, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). See generally,

Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violators: Alternatives to the Exclusionary

Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1981).
149. Brief for Respondent at 26, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
See generally, L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME
(1967).
150. Brief for Respondent at 25, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
Judge Wilkey, a staunch opponent to the exclusionary rule states that the 'goodfaith' exception puts a premium on ignorance and lack of training in law enforcement agencies." J. WILKEY, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BY ALTERNATIVES
TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE at 36 (1982). See also Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974).
151. Brief for Respondent at 20, United States v. Leon, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984).

152. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 420 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See supra notes 54-55

and accompanying text.
153. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 420-21. Chief Justice Burger further proposed that Congress and state legislatures develop statutory alternatives. Id. at 422-24. See infra
note 155 and accompanying text.
154. Id. at 422 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

155. Id. at 423. Chief Justice Burger proposed five provisions that Congress
might include in a statute allowing compensation and restitution for persons whose
fourth amendment rights have been violated. The five suggestions were: a) a waiver
of sovereign immunity as to the illegal acts of law enforcement officials committed
in the performance of assigned duties; b) the creation of a cause of action for damages
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Another possible alternative could have been to amend the Federal
Tort Claims Act. 56 Such an amendment would serve to impose liability

for actual and punitive damages in an amount not to exceed, for

example, $25,000 upon violation of a fourth amendment right.'
However, such an amendment would probably be ineffectual because

it lacks a provision for the imposition of sanctions against a guilty
police officer, thus it has no deterrent effect for police misconduct.' 58

Though trespass was the traditional remedy at common law,' 5 9
states allowed other tort actions, such as assault and false imprisonment. None of these traditional remedies has resulted in an effective
remedy. '1
D.

IMPACT OF THE LEON DECISION

To date, any application of the "good-faith exception" by the
Court has been confined to situations where officers of the law rely
on what they consider to be valid warrants for searches; however,
the future may see the "good-faith exception" implemented in cases
of warrantless searches as well.' 6 ' As Justice Brennan stated in his

dissenting opinion in Leon, "I am not at all confident that the exception unleashed today will remain so confined."' 6 2 Unfortunately,

sustained by any person aggrieved by conduct of governmental agents in violation
of the fourth amendment or statutes regulating official conduct; c) the creation of
a tribunal, quasi-judicial in nature or perhaps patterned after the United States Court
of Claims, to adjudicate all claims under the statute; d) a provision that this statutory
remedy is in lieu of the exclusion of evidence secured for use in criminal cases in
violation of the fourth amendment; and e) a provision directing that no evidence,
otherwise admissible, shall be excluded from any criminal proceeding because of violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 422-23.
156. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 (final decisions of district courts), 1346 & 1402 (United
States as a defendant), 2401 (time for commencing actions against the United States),
2402 (jury trial in actions against the United States), 2411 (interest), 2412 (costs and
fees), 2671-80 ("Tort Claims Procedure") (1970).

157. Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its
Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621, 710 [hereinafter cited as Geller, Enforcing
the Fourth Amendment].
158. Id. at 711. See also Brief for Respondent at 20-25, United States v. Leon,
104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
159. Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, supra note 157, at 713 n.372.
160. Id.at 690.
161. As this article went to print, there had been no Illinois decisions regarding
the "good-faith exception"; however, the Illinois Senate had proposed a bill to
incorporate the Leon decision into Section 114-12 of the "Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963." SB0155, 84th Gen. Ass'y, 1985.
162. Brief for Respondent at 20, United States v. Leon, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984).
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the ultimate impact of the Leon decision will not be felt until such
time as the Court is faced with the quesion of whether the "goodfaith exception" extends to warrantless searches. Upon such a determination, the Leon impact should be felt most to the extent that the
Court is willing to exclude fourth amendment rights from constitutional protection.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of the United States has severely restricted
the exclusionary rule in its role of protecting fourth amendment rights.
By focusing on the deterrence of official misconduct as the sole rationale in support of the weakened exclusionary rule, the Court appears to be denying its role as guardian of the Constitution. By adopting Justice White's "good-faith exception," the search for an alternative
to the rule is ended. However, this exception has left the door wide
open for police officers to do as they please under a veil of "goodfaith." A citizen may now be convicted by evidence which, prior to
Leon, would have been considered illegally seized under the fourth
amendment. As Justice White clears the path to criminal convictions
for the guilty, the stones he casts aside are pelting each and every
citizen's fourth amendment rights as guaranteed under the Constitution.
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